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Abstract
‘Quantum theory’ is not a single physical theory but a framework in
which many different concrete theories fit. As such, a solution to the
quantum measurement problem ought to provide a recipe to interpret
each such concrete theory, in a mutually consistent way. But with the
exception of the Everett interpretation, the mainextant solutions either
try to make sense of the abstract framework as if it were concrete, or
else interpret one particular quantum theory under the fiction that it
is fundamental and exact. In either case, these approaches are unable
to help themselves to the very theory-laden, level-relative ways in which
quantum theory makes contact with experiment in mainstream physics,
and so are committed to major revisionary projects which have not been
carried out even in outline. As such, only the Everett interpretation is
currently suited to make sense of quantum physics as we find it.
1 Introduction
Philosophy is what you do when you don’t yet know what the right
questions are to ask.
Daniel Dennett1
As of 2017, the debate about the correct interpretation of quantum theory
seems largely deadlocked. There is a reasonable consensus within philosophy
of physics on what the main viable interpretative strategies are, which goes
something like this (see subsequent discussion for references):
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1. ‘Realist’ strategies, dominated by:
(a) Hidden-variable theories, most notably the de Broglie-Bohm theory
(aka Bohmian mechanics);
(b) Dynamical collapse theories, most notably the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber
theory and Pearle’s continuous-state-localisation theory;
(c) The Everett interpretation, in its modern (decoherence-based) form.
2. ‘Non-realist’ strategies, notably (but not exhaustively):
(a) The (various forms of the) Copenhagen interpretation;
(b) Physics-is-information approaches, most notably the ‘Quantum Bayesian-
ism’ or ‘QBism’ of Chris Fuchs and co-workers;
(c) Healey’s quantum pragmatism.
The debate over realist-vs-non-realist strategies has been fairly cursory in
recent discussions and has largely turned on general disagreements about the
legitimate aims of science: Maudlin (1995), for instance, simply takes as read
that quantum theory ought to have a representational role, while according
to Fuchs and Peres (2000a, 2000b) or Healey (2012, 2017b), a central lesson
of quantum mechanics is that it does not have such a role and needs to be
understood more as some kind of predictive or calculational tool. In the bulk of
philosophy of physics (in particular in its more metaphysically inclined corners),
indeed, the non-realist strategies are set aside almost without comment.2
Meanwhile, comparative assessment of the realist strategies has tended to
turn on relatively detailed, and fairly metaphysical, concerns with those strate-
gies. Can the Everett interpretation explain probability? Is Bohmian mechanics
just Everett in denial? How do dynamical-collapse theories resolve the prob-
lem of tails?3 The form of the discussion normally takes as read that these
various approaches would succeed in ‘solving the measurement problem’ if only
these metaphysical problems could be resolved. Indeed, it is common (see, e. g. ,
Cordero (2001), Egg (2014), Lewis (2015), Lyre (2010)) to describe the choice
between realist interpretations as a classic case of underdetermination of the-
ory by data, with Bohmian mechanics, the GRW theory, and (sometimes) the
Everett interpretation all on a par empirically and to be distinguished only by
assessments of ‘extra-empirical virtues’, again of a largely metaphysical nature:
preservation of determinism, avoidance of ontological extravagance, conformity
with intuition, conformity with the spirit of relativity. If so, there seems to be
little realistic likelihood of consensus, or even significant progress, on the in-
tepretation of quantum mechanics any time soon. But perhaps we can console
2Productive debate is not helped by the fact that most critics and defenders of what I here
call ‘non-realist’ strategies regard ‘realist’ as a virtue term: witness in particular Fuchs’ (2017)
plea to critics not to call QBism anti-realist, but also Healey’s description of his position as
a ‘third way’ between realism and non-realism. I don’t myself think the label is particularly
helpful (I will later argue that ‘non-representationalist’ is a more neutral description); my
summation here is intended as descriptive of the sociology of the field.
3See Wallace (2008) for references in each case.
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ourselves that even if the final answers to the questions of quantum intepreta-
tion will continue to elude us, at least we have a clear understanding of what
the questions are and what the space of possible answers looks like.
But in philosophy, most of the work, and most of the controversy, lies pre-
cisely in stating and understanding the questions, and so apparent consensus
on how to frame a problem is often a sign of hidden assumptions and commu-
nication failure.4 And so it is in quantum theory (I shall argue). Advocates
of different interpretative strategies differ not just on technical details of those
strategies, or on assessment of whether and how those strategies overcome their
own specific problems, but on basic questions of philosophy of science: notably,
on how theories confront experiment and on how they represent physical facts.
And (relatedly) they differ on what the theory is that we are supposed to in-
terpret: to a first approximation, advocates of different strategies are trying to
interpret very different theories in the first place. Put succinctly, if the central
question in philosophy of quantum theory is ‘what is the correct interpretation
of quantum mechanics’, then as well as open disagreement about the assessment
of ‘correct’, there is hidden disagreement about the meaning of ‘interpretation’
and, even more so, of ‘quantum mechanics’.
To expand slightly, the case I will make is that:
1. Quantum theory is a framework theory, under which many specific quan-
tum theories stand. These theories are related by different (and only par-
tially understood) instantiation relations (where the instantiation relation
holds between two specific quantum theories, describing the same system
at different levels of detail) but a satisfactory interpretation of quantum
mechanics must be a strategy for interpreting each of these theories in
its own terms. No satisfactory interpretation can be an interpretation of
the ‘fundamental’ quantum theory, partly because we do not have any
such theory to interpret at present but mostly because the way in which
quantum theory makes contact with experiment is through this plurality
of different theories and cannot be cleanly described in the vocabulary of
any one quantum theory, however fundamental.
2. Neither the so-called ‘non-realist’ interpretations (I will argue that ‘non-
representationalist’ is a fairer name), nor the strategies that aim to modify
or supplement quantum theory, adequately deal with the theory as it is
actually used and tested in science. Rather, they attempt to interpret
either the abstract framework (in a way which is not at present adequate
to recover the empirical success of particular instances of that framework),
or else they interpret a particular theory within that framework, under
the fiction that it is by itself adequate to all quantum phenomena (and
4For examples elsewhere in philosophy, consider free will, or the mind-body problem. In
the former case, careful formal proofs to the effect that we do or do not have free will tend to
pack most of the philosophical work into apparently-uncontentious premises (Dennett 1984,
p.3); in the latter case, even deciding to frame the issues in terms of an ‘easy’ and ‘hard’
problem (Chalmers 1995) concedes most of the ground on which hardline functionalists will
want to fight (Dennett 2005, ch.6).
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as such rely on a once-and-for-all account of how quantum theories make
contact with empirical data which is again not adequate to recover the full
empirical successes of quantum theory). Only the Everett interpretation
attempts to provide a general recipe to interpret the various particular
quantum theories in a way which is compatible with their interrelations.
These conclusions are not neutral: they give strong support for the Everett
interpretation, of which I have been a longstanding advocate. That’s not a
coincidence: the paper is a codification and development of what I have long
thought to be the strongest reasons for that interpretation (building on pre-
liminary versions of these arguments presented in Wallace (2008, pp.83-85) and
Wallace (2012, pp.33–35)). But I hope even readers sceptical of this particu-
lar conclusion might be persuadable of the general point that the deadlock in
discussions of interpretation can be broken — or at least, our understanding of
the problem can be deepened — by focussing less on specifics of the particular
interpretative strategies, and more on what we should reasonably require of a
solution to the measurement problem in the first place.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in sections 2 I develop the idea of
quantum theory as a framework, and in section 3 I consider how to think about
inter-theoretic relations between concrete theories in that framework. In sec-
tions 4–6 I consider, sequentially, Everettian quantum mechanics, so-called non-
realist strategies, and strategies that try to supplement or modify the quantum
formalism, and explore how each fits into the conception of quantum mechanics
developed in sections 2–3. Section 7 is the conclusion. The physics I discuss
in the paper is for the most part standard and well-established, and I do not
attempt to give original references.
2 Quantum theory: frameworks and instances
Asked what ‘quantum theory’ is, two initially-plausible answers might be:
Abstract quantum mechanics: A quantum theory is specified by:
1. A Hilbert space H (the rays of which represent possible states of the
system);
2. A collection of self-adjoint operators on H which represent the ob-
servables of the system (this is a term of art; a more neutral term
might be ‘physical quantities’).
3. A preferred observable Ĥ, the Hamiltonian, which generates the sys-
tem’s dynamics via the Schro¨dinger equation
ih¯
∂
∂t
|ψ(t)〉 = Ĥ |ψ(t)〉 . (1)
Physical content is extracted from the theory by the Born rule, which
states that the expectation value, on measurement, of the observable
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corresponding to operator Ô, if the system’s quantum state is |ψ〉 is
〈Ô〉ψ = 〈ψ| Ô |ψ〉 . (2)
Quantum particle mechanics: The quantum theory of N particles of mass
m1, . . .mn is specified by a function ψ from the 3N -dimensional configu-
ration space of those N particles to the complex numbers, satisfying the
Schro¨dinger equation
ih¯
∂ψ
∂t
(x, t) = −
∑
1≤i≤N
h¯2
2mi
∇2iψ(x, t) +
∑
1≤i<j≤N
Vij(|xi − xj |)ψ(x, t) (3)
where Vij is the interaction energy between particles i and j, x repre-
sents, schematically, the N -tuple of coordinates x1, . . .xN on configura-
tion space, and ∇i is the gradient with respect to xi. Physical content is
extracted from the theory by the Born rule, which states that the proba-
bility density, on measurement, of finding the particles in configuration x
at time t is
Pr(x; t) = |ψ(x, t)|2. (4)
As accounts of quantum mechanics as a scientific theory, both accounts are
for different reasons very deficient (even before we address more philosophical
concerns like the quantum measurement problem). To begin with ‘abstract
quantum mechanics’: in an important sense this is not really a scientific theory
at all. By itself it makes no predictions and explains no phenomena; by itself
it cannot be tested or falsified. It is a framework within which concrete quan-
tum theories can be stated: a given theory within the framework is specified
(typically) by a specific choice of Hilbert space, a specific choice of dynamical
variables (represented by self-adjoint operators), a specific dynamics (repre-
sented by some choice of Hamiltonian) and often a specific decomposition into
subsystems. These specific, concrete theories can of course be tested, and those
tests can indirectly confirm or falsify the viability of the framework, but without
being supplemented by a particular concrete realisation of the framework, it can
do only very little scientific work.
When we recognise this, we can also see what is deficient about ‘N -particle
quantum mechanics’: it is only one example of a quantum theory, and one of
quite restricted applicability. Indeed, strictly speaking there is to my knowledge
only one small class of applications of wave mechanics in this form: to the hy-
drogen atom, and to other ions with only one electron. If the theory is modified
to include identical particles, background potentials, and spin, its applicability
becomes much wider: most of atomic physics, and most of quantum chemistry,
and a large part of solid state physics falls within its remit, taking the ‘particles’
to be electrons and the nuclei of atoms. But even there, the theory rarely suffices
to describe all the relevant phenomena of a system: for instance, atomic energy
levels are calculated within this theory, but the theory cannot incorporate the
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de-excitation of those energy levels by photon emission which is the main route
by which we test the theory’s energy-level predictions.5
A really satisfactory description of ‘quantum mechanics’ would have to char-
acterise it as a large collection of theories, each fitting (more or less) within the
abstract framework, and each applicable to different systems and at different
energy- and length-scales. One of those theories would be N -particle quan-
tum mechanics. Or more accurately: many of those theories would be different
forms of N -particle quantum mechanics, with different numbers and statistics
of particles, different background potentials, and different interpretations of the
‘particles’. (Sometimes they are electrons, sometimes ions, sometimes the cen-
tres of mass of larger bodies — even (Zurek and Paz 1995) moons or planets.)
Others would be quantum field theories of various kinds, applicable to various
situations involving light, collective excitations of solid bodies, or relativistic
effects. Others still would be discrete theories with finite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, applicable to the internal degrees of freedom of certain systems whose
spatial degrees of freedom can be idealised away.
It should not be surprising to find that ‘quantum theory’ needs to be char-
acterised this way. After all, the same is true for ‘classical mechanics’. There we
could have tried to characterise the theory as the abstract form of Hamiltonian
or Lagrangian mechanics, or as the theory of point particles interacting under
long-range forces. There too, the first characterises a framework for dynamical
theories rather than a concrete theory; the latter characterises a theory which
captures only a small part of classical mechanics (failing to capture, for instance,
electromagnetic effects, or the physics of rigid bodies or fluids). And classical
particle mechanics, like quantum particle mechanics, is best thought of not as a
single theory but as a wide class of different theories, characterised by different
particle masses, interactions, background potentials, and interpretations of the
‘particles’. (Recall that in the most famous application of classical mechanics,
the ‘particles’ are the centers of masses of the Sun and planets.) If we were
to set out to ‘interpret classical mechanics’, our task would not be completed
either by trying to interpret the abstract form of Hamiltonian mechanics as a
concrete theory (which would simply be a category error), or by trying to in-
terpret classical particle mechanics (which has no univocal interpretation, and
in any case is only a small part of classical mechanics).6
At least prima facie, the same would seem to apply to quantum theory.
Before developing this point, though, I need to develop further the picture
of quantum theory I have sketched by considering how different versions of
quantum theory relate to one another.
5The theory is also somewhat misrepresented in the form I have given it by its focus on
configuration space and on the position representation, but that can more readily be fixed.
6Mark Wilson has developed (essentially) this view of classical mechanics in much more
depth; see, in particular, Wilson (2013).
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3 Quantum theory: inter-theoretic relations
A tempting and popular picture of inter-theoretic relations is that of a tower of
theories, each approximating the theory below it in the appropriate limit.7 For
physics, at the bottom of the tower would lie the Standard Model of particle
physics (perhaps with its base shrouded in mist to leave room for the hoped-for
theory of quantum gravity that it approximates). Above it, perhaps, would
be quantum electrodynamics; above that, the quantum theory of photons and
nonrelativistic atoms; above that, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; above
that, perhaps, classical particle mechanics, and then classical fluid mechanics.
But this picture is badly misleading. It implies there is some unified class of
phenomena all simultaneously describable by the Standard Model, some subclass
of that class simultaneously describable by quantum electrodynamics, and so
forth. In reality in physics, modelling is local. A given system — say, the
electrons of a metal, or the electrons and nuclei of an ion — might be describable
by quantum particle mechanics, but it does not follow that in anything but
the most formal sense there is a single system comprising both systems that
is describable by it. Indeed, sometimes the same system is described by the
same theory at different levels: for instance, the electrons in the metal might be
treated as evolving against a classical background potential which, at a deeper
level of description, is produced by a lattice of ions. Nor is there any consistent
hierarchy of theories: in classical mechanics, for instance, a collection of lattices
of masses connected by stiff springs could be describable at one level by point-
particle mechanics (with the ‘particles’ being the lattice elements), at a higher
level by rigid-body mechanics (with the ‘bodies’ being the lattices), and at a
higher level still by point-particle mechanics again (with the ‘particles’ being
the centers of masses of the lattices).
So a better picture is more like a patchwork than a tower: for any given
system there are various levels of description at which various theories are ap-
plicable. And since the notion of ‘system’ is itself theory-laden, there is no
theory-free starting language with which we can describe this picture. For in-
stance, one ‘system’ is comprised of the centers of masses of the bodies in the
Solar system, but ‘center of mass’ is itself theory-laden and theory-relative.
(Again, see Wilson ibid for further development of this point in the classical
context.)
What do inter-theoretic relationships look like on this picture? If they exist,
they would have to look like this: if theory X describes a system at some level of
description, and theory Y describes that same system at a more detailed level,
then the description from theory X can in some sense be derived from that of
theory Y. And if several systems S1 through Sn can be described separately by
theory X at a higher level, and collectively by theory Y at a lower level, we can
derive from theory Y both the applicability of X to the systems separately and
the validity, at that level, of the decomposition into subsystems. Ultimately we
might hope to find a sufficiently fine-grained level of description at which the
7The classic statement of this view is Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).
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whole Universe can be jointly regarded as a single system, and the applicabilities
of all of the higher-level theories derived directly or indirectly from it.
It is not a priori obvious that things must work out this way: Nature could
be inherently disunified, with many different descriptions on different length-
scales and no systematic relations between them. Cartwright (1983, 1999) has
argued, based on careful study of case studies in physics and other areas of
science, that indeed this is the case. But (although there is far more to say here
than space permits) this kind of disunified picture — whatever its metaphysi-
cal coherence or incoherence — does not seem to give adequate weight to the
great many cases in which physicists have actually succeeded in constructing
local inter-level relations. Most of solid state physics, for instance, and most
of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, and much of particle physics and as-
trophysics, is concerned with deriving higher-level descriptions from lower-level
ones, and there are a great many successes that have led to novel empirical pre-
dictions, albeit they often involve approximations and assumptions, and contain
conceptual puzzles of their own. And the progress of physics does seem to be a
progression towards greater unification: the many different solid-state systems
are all instantiations of the same nonrelativistic quantum theory; the physics of
stellar interiors and of stellar atmospheres seem to be derivable from the same
underlying physics under different assumptions. We have reached the point
where one theory, the standard model of particle physics (with the spacetime
metric treated as one more quantum field) is at least a candidate to underly
all the various applications of high-level physics, and to provide the basis for
explanation of all physical phenomena outside the extremes of the early universe
and the singularities within black holes. So notwithstanding Cartwright’s criti-
cisms, I will continue for this article to assume — tentatively — that the various
applications of physics are indeed interrelated by locally-valid derivations, and
ultimately that all can be underpinned by the Standard Model.
If we want to interpret quantum mechanics, then, should we simply interpret
the Standard Model, and regard every other quantum theory as derivative upon
it, or even just as useful calculational tools? There are two problems with so
doing. Firstly, almost all our evidence for quantum mechanics is in the first
instance evidence for some higher-level quantum theory, not for the Standard
Model directly. In most concrete applications we do not have an explicit deriva-
tion of that higher-level theory from the Standard Model; even in the most
favourable cases, we have a long and indirect chain of derivations. As such, the
way in which the Standard Model confronts experiment is almost exclusively
indirectly, via tests of higher-level theories.
For instance, quantum theory allows us to calculate the heat capacity of
a crystalline insulating solid at low temperatures: it scales with the fourth
power of the temperature. That prediction cannot even be stated, much less
derived, in the Standard Model, where ‘crystalline insulating solid’ is not a well-
defined term. Other quantum predictions concern the spectral lines of excited
atoms, or the conductivity of metals, or the phase transitions of superfluids,
or the neutrino emissions of stars; again, these cannot directly be stated, let
alone tested, within the Standard Model. To understand quantum mechanics
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well enough to recover its empirical success, we need to understand the various
different quantum theories and their theoretical content. That understanding
might in principle be derivative on some understanding of the Standard Model,
but it cannot simply be skipped — not if our goal is to understand quantum
mechanics as it is in fact used and tested.
Secondly, the standard model — like almost all empirically-relevant quan-
tum field theories — is an effective field theory. What this means, in outline
(see Wallace (2011, 2017) for a more detailed discussion) is that while the theory
is formally a continuum field theory defined on arbitrarily short lengthscales,
in fact it must be ‘cut off’ below some short lengthscale, which represents the
point at which the theory breaks down and ceases to be accurate. (For the Stan-
dard Model, defined as I have to include the spacetime metric, that lengthscale
is the Planck length.) Effective field theories are by their nature not candi-
dates for a fundamental theory; indeed, they are not really theories at all in
the philosopher’s usual sense, but equivalence classes of theories, with different
cutoffs and different implementations of the cutoff, but the same larger-scale
structure. Insofar as the interpretation of ‘quantum mechanics’ ought to be
concerned with a single well-defined, universal theory, that theory cannot be
the Standard Model but would have to be the yet-unknown theory of quantum
gravity which, we hope, underlies it. But since we do not have that theory, it
would be premature to try to interpret it, and more premature still to conflate
the task of understanding that theory with that of making sense of quantum
theory.
4 Interpretative recipes and the Everett inter-
pretation
Given this account of quantum theory — or rather, given this account of the
many quantum theories and the system-local, not-fully-hierarchical relations
between them — what should we expect from an ‘interpretation’ of quantum
mechanics? Here is one natural answer: we should expect an interpretative
recipe, a set of instructions which tells us, for any given quantum theory, how
to understand that theory. Furthermore, the recipe must be compatible with
inter-theoretic relations: if theory X instantiates theory Y in certain regimes,
our understanding of theory X ought to tell us how to understand theory Y ,
and it should deliver the same understanding as we would get by applying the
recipe to Y directly. (I use ‘understanding’ here as a term neutral between pure
interpretations of the quantum formalism, and strategies which supplement it
with additional variables or modify its equations.)
The interpretation of classical mechanics has exactly this ‘recipe’ form. The
interpretative recipe says, simply: interpret the classical phase space as a space
of possible states that a physical system is in, so that a system with dynam-
ical history x(t) has, at time t, the physical features represented by x(t). At
this level of abstraction, there is little more to be said: in particular, it would
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be a category error to ask for ‘the’ ontology of classical mechanics. For any
particular classical theory, we can ask for the ontology of that theory (and at
that level, there is space for controversy as to interpretative matters even in
classical physics: the substantivalist/relationist dispute is such a controversy,
for instance). But that answer will have to be fairly structuralist, because the
ontology of a theory instantiated by another theory must be compatible with
the ontology of the latter theory, and inter-theoretic relations in classical me-
chanics are cashed out in terms of structure and dynamics and don’t fit into (for
instance) any standard mereological form. If there were a classical ur -theory un-
derlying all other classical theories, we could regard ontological questions about
that particular theory as questions of ‘fundamental classical ontology’ and see
the ontologies of all other classical theories as derivative from it; but there is
no such theory, and so all questions of ontology in classical physics will have
a somewhat local, scale-dependent nature. (For further development of these
points see Wallace (2016a).)
Turning back to quantum mechanics, the Everett interpretation also has the
recipe form. To be more specific, by ‘the Everett interpretation’ I have in mind
here the interpretation in its modern form, with decoherence understood as pro-
viding an emergent branching structure for the macroscopic degrees of freedom,
with higher-level ontology understood in structural terms, and with no mod-
ification of the quantum formalism, as developed by, e. g. , Zeh (1973, 1993),
Zurek 1991, 1998), Gell-Mann and Hartle (1989, 1993), Saunders 1993, 1995,
1997, and myself (Wallace 2003, 2010, 2012). (The extent to which this con-
forms to Everett’s own views is moot ,though see Bevers (2011), Barrett (2011b,
2011a), and the commentary in Everett (2012) for some considerations.) Indeed,
at this level of abstraction the Everet interpretation is pretty much the same
as the interpretation of classical mechanics: the formalism is left unchanged,
the state space of a system is interpreted as a space of possible physical states
for that system, and the evolution of the quantum state under the Schro¨dinger
equation is interpreted as describing the change over time of the system’s physi-
cal properties. The ‘emergence of the classical world from quantum mechanics’,
in any particular physical situation, is just a special case of inter-theoretic re-
duction. (And to ask about ‘the’ ontology of Everettian quantum mechanics is
again to commit a category error.)
Of course, this level of abstraction hides subtlety and controversy. Applied
to microscopic systems, the Everett interpretation delivers an ontology which
is not readily described in the categories of ordinary experience. Applied to
macroscopic systems, it describes the state as representing not one, but an
indeterminately-large multiplicity, of classical states (and it represents each of
them only approximately and emergently). And to connect to experience in
the latter case, we must interpret the branch-weights assigned to the classical
states probabilistically. Each of these contains philosophical subtleties sufficient
to allow a skeptic to reject the interpretation, even before any weight is given
to the ontological extravagance of Everett-interpreted quantum theory.
But this is not the place to explore the viability of the Everett interpretation.
(I defend it in extenso in Wallace (2012).) My point here is more modest:
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because the Everett interpretation has the recipe form, it is at least a candidate
for an interpretation of quantum mechanics suitable for physics as we find it.
Among the commonly-discussed alternatives to the Everett interpretation, none
have the recipe form, and so — I will argue — none is actually in a position
to explain quantum theory as it is in fact used in physics. I begin with the
so-called ‘non-realist’ strategies.
5 Non-representational approaches to quantum
theory
As a starting point to understand the common core of ‘pragmatist’, ‘Copen-
hagen’ and ‘information-based’ approaches to quantum theory, consider the
classic Schro¨dinger-cat state
α |live cat〉+ β |dead cat〉 (5)
which unitary quantum theory can straightforwardly produce. If the quantum
state can be understood representationally — that is, if distinct quantum states
correspond to distinct objective ways a physical system can be — and if the
theory is unsupplemented by hidden variables, then it looks as if such a state
must somehow represent a cat that is simultaneously alive and dead, or perhaps
neither alive nor dead. Quite apart from the weirdness of such a thing, it seems
in conflict with what quantum mechanics itself tells us, via the Born rule, that
we should expect to observe given a system in such a state: namely, either a
live cat, or a dead one, and with probabilities |α|2, |β|2 respectively.
But there are other roles than representation for a piece of mathematical
formalism to play. Consider the probability distributions of classical statistical
mechanics, for instance: mathematically they are functions on phase space but
different such functions correspond not to different states of the actual world,
but to different probability distributions over the possible states of the world
(however the notion of probability is to be understood here).8 And in particular,
distributions can have nontrivial support on regions of phase space correspond-
ing to macroscopically distinct states of affairs: for instance, the probability
distribution that statistical mechanics assigns to a ferromagnet cooled below its
critical temperature is, in the first instance, an equally-weighted sum of distri-
butions describing the magnet with magnetisation in all possible directions. But
this does not represent a ferromagnet in some weirdly indefinite state of magneti-
sation, but merely a magnet with equal probability of being magnetised in each
possible direction. Non-representational strategies take the quantum state as
playing a role at least somewhat akin to the statistical-mechanical distribution:
8I have in mind here classical statistical mechanics as it was understood before the quantum
revolution: that is, on the false view that classical physics was exact. I argue elsewhere
(Wallace 2016b) that even supposedly-classical systems in the actual universe should not
be understood in purely classical terms: rather, they should be understood as quantum-
mechanical states (mixed or pure) in the decoherent limit.
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as encoding the various probabilities associated to a physical system. Different
strategies differ in the way they understand those probabilities: as encoding our
information about a system, or our partial beliefs about it, for instance, or as
providing a practical guide to how to use and interact the system. And just as
it would be misleading to call classical statistical mechanics non-realist simply
because the distribution function does not play a representational role, so would
it be misleading to call these approaches to quantum theory non-realist simply
because in those theories the quantum state does not play a representational
role either.
However, we can reasonably ask: if the quantum state does not represent
the physical state of a system, what — if anything — does? Classical mechanics
provides a straightforward answer to its analogous question: the points of phase
space represent physical states, and the classical observables — those functions
that correspond to position, momentum and the like — represent the physical
properties of those states. In doing so, classical statistical mechanics also offers a
straightforward answer to the question of what the probabilities are probabilities
of : they are the probabilities of the system being in one physical state or an-
other. And this representational story will vary from one classical-mechanical
system to another, and in each case the theory itself will provide the repre-
sentational machinery. In this way, an ‘interpretation’ of classical statistical
mechanics in terms of probability distributions straightforwardly is compatible
with the idea of classical statistical mechanics as a whole being a framework
theory: it provides, for each concrete instantiation of statistical mechanics, an
interpretation of the distribution function in that instantiation. In the classical
dilute gas it represents probabilities for the particles to have various positions
and momenta; in a classical model of the ferromagnet it represents probabil-
ities for the individual magnetic atoms to have one orientation or the other;
and so forth through the indefinitely many physical systems to which classical
statistical mechanics can be applied. (Note that this interpretation of classical
statistical mechanics has the ‘recipe form’ which I discussed in section 4.)
In the dawn of quantum theory it was possible to imagine essentially the
same story playing out. Quantum systems are equipped with algebras of ‘ob-
servables’ that correspond to the dynamical variables that describe a physical
system, and the quantum state provides — and, conversely, is completely char-
acterised by its description as — a probability distribution over those variables.
So it would be extremely natural to suppose that the physical state of any quan-
tum system is given by some definite value of each of its observables and that
the quantum state is a probability distribution over those physical states. Such
an interpretation would seem to be a very natural generalisation of classical
statistical mechanics (and, again, to have the recipe form). A shame, then, that
such an interpretation is impossible: von Neumann’s original no-hidden-variable
theorem (von Neumann 1955) shows that it cannot be done straighforwardly,
and the Kochen-Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker 1967) rules it out pretty
much completely. So any viable non-representational account of quantum me-
chanics will owe us another account of what the probabilities encoded in the
quantum state are probabilities of, of what the physical features of systems are.
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Or, put in more pragmatic terms: what the non-quantum features of a system
are such that the quantum state is a tool for answering questions about those
features.
In the heyday of the Copenhagen interpretation, the standard answer (made
explicit in, e. g. , Landau and Lifshitz (1977)) was: the physical description of
a system is a classical description; quantum mechanics cannot be understood
except against a background of classical mechanics. This line is quite rarely de-
fended in modern physics,9, for familiar reasons: separating off ‘classical’ from
‘quantum’ physics is not at all trivial in an era where the quantum-classical
transition is a major topic of theoretical and empirical study, where the classi-
fication of a system as ‘classical’ or ‘quantum’ has become a matter of degree,
and where the language of experimental physics is rich with terms — ‘laser’,
‘superconductor’, ‘LCD’ whose very definition is quantum-mechanical.
Richard Healey (2017a), in discussing his ‘pragmatist’ interpretation of quan-
tum theory (developed in more detail in Healey ((2012, 2017b), this volume), is
keenly aware of this issue:
A successful interpretation must explain how quantum mechanics
may be formulated as a precise physical theory and unambiguously
applied to real-life physical situations . . . by applying quantum me-
chanics we become able better to describe and represent those situa-
tions in non-quantum terms. I say non-quantum rather than classi-
cal to acknowledge that the progress of science naturally introduces
novel language to describe or represent the world (Bose-Einstein
condensate, Mott insulator, quark-gluon plasma). (Healey 2017a)
But how does science ’naturally introduce’ this novel language? Take ‘quark-
gluon plasma’, for instance. I can give you a verbal gloss on what that means
— it’s a state of matter so hot that protons and neutrons — normally made
up of three tightly-bound quarks — break up into individual quarks. But that
verbal gloss isn’t the real physical description — it is a metaphor at best, a
fiction at worst. Let’s see what happens if we ask for a proper (albeit still a bit
simplified) account of ‘quark-gluon plasma’.
Q: What’s the quark-gluon plasma?
A: It’s the state of a quantum-chromodynamics (QCD) system above a certain
temperature, at which a phase transition occurs to a state where the
fermionic elementary excitations are associated to the quark field rather
than to color-neutral products of that field.
Q: Slow down. What’s ‘temperature’ in QCD?
A: A quantum system, including a field-theoretic system, is at (canonical) ther-
mal equilibrium when its quantum state is
ρ(β) ∝ exp(−βĤ) (6)
9A notable exception is Peres (1993).
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where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian and β is a real number. For a system at
thermal equilibrium — or that is reasonably close to thermal equilibrium
— its temperature T is given by β = 1/kBT .
Q: And what’s an ‘elementary excitation’?
A: Generally in quantum field theory, we can analyse systems in states reason-
ably close to the thermal equilibrium state as gases of weakly-interacting
particles. Those weakly-interacting particles are the elementary excita-
tions.
Q: ‘Particles’ as in classical point particles?
A: Not really. ‘Particles’ as in subsystems whose Hilbert space bears an irre-
ducible representation of the Poincare´ group, at least in the interaction-
free limit.
Q: So the quark-gluon plasma is associated with one sort of particle, colder
systems with another. Shouldn’t I be able to say what the ‘particles’ are
once-and-for-all?
A: Not in quantum field theory: the optimal choice of particle depends on the
state of the system. Hot systems are described most naturally in terms of
quarks, colder systems, in terms of protons and neutrons.
Q: Can’t I just think of a proton or neutron as an agglomeration of three
quarks?
A: Only heuristically. The more precise way to explain the relation between
the protons and quarks is at the field level: the proton is associated with
a certain triple product of the quark field.
Q: How is a particle supposed to be associated with a field?
A: If a quantum system is in thermal-equilibrium state ρ(β), the ‘two-point
function’ of that system with respect to field φ̂(x) and that state is
G2(x− y;φ, β) = Tr(ρ(β)φ̂(x)φ̂(y)). (7)
If the Fourier transform of that state has a pole, there’s a particle associ-
ated with it.
Q: That’s a weird postulate.
A: It’s not a postulate; it’s something you derive, by looking at the dynamics
of states obtained by excitations of the thermal-equilibrium state. Where
there’s a pole, there’s a subspace of states which can be interpreted as
superpositions of singly-localised excitations and which is preserved under
the dynamics.10
10Experts will recognise this as (a corollary of) the Callan-Lehmann representation of the
two-point function; see, e. g. , Peskin and Schroeder (1995, ch.7) for the details.
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Q: What’s a ‘plasma’, anyway?
A: In ‘quark-gluon plasma’ it’s a bit metaphorical. This phase of QCD has a
lot in common with ordinary electromagnetic plasmas, which are charac-
terised by screening of the Coulomb force, or equivalently by the photon
acquiring mass.
Q: I thought the photon was massless?
A: The mass of a particle depends on the quantum state. If the state is the
vacuum or some small excitation of the vacuum, then yes, photons are
massless. But in a state that’s an excitation of a hot, high-density system
of protons and electrons, the photon acquires mass.
Q: What do you mean, ‘acquires mass’?
A: It’s a dynamical statement about elementary excitations again, derived from
looking at the plasma dynamics. There’s again a formal statement in terms
of poles of two-point functions.
It doesn’t matter if you followed all of the details of the above; they’re not the
main point. (I could have carried out essentially the same exercise with ‘Bose-
Einstein condensate’ or ‘Mott insulator’.) The main point is that I have not the
faintest idea how to make sense of any of this without taking the quantum state
of the QCD system, and its dynamical evolution under the Schro¨dinger equation,
as representational. (Even the claim that the system has temperature T is a
claim about its state.) I don’t know how to begin eliminating representational
uses of the state from my account of the quark-gluon plasma — and, to the best
of my knowledge, neither does Healey.
If Healey departs from Copenhagen-style use of classical physics in order
to seek a broader conception of objectivity in physics, the ‘quantum Bayesian-
ism’ (or QBism) of Chris Fuchs and co-workers moves radically in the opposite
direction:11
the primitive concept of experience is fundamental to an understand-
ing of science. According to QBism, quantum mechanics is a tool
anyone can use to evaluate, on the basis of ones past experience, ones
probabilistic expectations for ones subsequent experience. (Fuchs,
Mermin, and Schack 2014)
Taken at its most straightforward, quotes like this seem to suggest that the
probabilities of quantum theory are probabilities of agents having certain ex-
periences. It can be tempting for more conventionally-inclined physicists or
philosophers to argue against such a view on the grounds that science should
give us something more objective, less apparently solipsistic — but the real place
to object is more mundane. Namely: the formalism of any particular quantum
11For presentations, see, e. g. , Caves, Fuchs, and Schack (2002), Fuchs (2002) or Fuchs,
Mermin, and Schack (2014).
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theory doesn’t say anything about experiences. In any concrete instantiation
of quantum theory, the observables over which probability distributions are de-
fined are particle positions, field strengths, collective spins and the like. The
only way to say anything non-circularly about an agent’s experience in quan-
tum mechanics is to characterise it externally, as an experience of something
describable in a more physical language. And then the problems confronted by
the Copenhagen strategy, and by Healey, reappear.
It’s reasonable then to ask how it is that Fuchs et al (and Healey, for that
matter) actually manages to develop and apply a non-representational version
of quantum mechanics. (And it would be unfair not to recognise that they
do indeed demonstrate a significant number of applications). The answer is
that the explanations they provide of quantum phenomena are (I think with-
out exception) explanations of features of quantum theory in the abstract —
Bell inequality violations, EPR effects, quantum state tomography and the like.
They treat measurement as primitive and make no use of details of any par-
ticular quantum system (sometimes a two-state system is described using spin
variables but even then there is no particular connection to the physics of spin).
Non-representational strategies, we might say, provide an interpretation of
the abstract framework of quantum theory. They do not appear to provide
a method — at least at present — to interpret any particular instance of that
framework. Explanations of, say, superconductivity, or the heat capacity of crys-
tals, or the thermodynamic features of the quark-gluon plasma, or the colour of
gold, or any of the thousands of concrete applications of quantum theory that
form its real empirical base, seem out of reach for QBism, or for pragmatism,
at least as they are currently stated. From this perspective it is unsurpris-
ing to find that advocacy of these approaches within physics is predominantly
found in quantum information, a field whose power indeed comes from studying
those features of quantum theory that are common to all instances of the the-
ory, rather than those physical explanations which are irreducibly quantum but
which require engagement with the features of one or other specific quantum
theory.
Let me close this section with an observation drawn from more general phi-
losophy of science. The non-representationalist strategy — interpreting some
large part of the content of physics not as representing things in themselves
but as an inferential or pragmatic tool used in describing some smaller class of
physically-real phenomena — is not new, nor is it specific to quantum theory.
It is, rather, the central idea in the logical-positivist and logical-empiricist pic-
tures of science (see Creath (2017) and references therein for historical details).
There, we make a principled distinction between the ‘observation language’ in
which our observations are described, and the ‘theory language’ in which the
non-observational parts of our scientific theories are stated. The observation
language is to be understood literally, but the theory language is not; rather, it
is an inferential or pragmatic tool to help us derive truths stated in the obser-
vation language.
It is almost universally accepted today that these approaches are not vi-
able. But the predominant reason, historically, that they fell from grace was
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not some awakening realisation among philosophers of science that scientific
theories ‘should’ give a more robust account of the unobservable.12 It was the
increasingly clear realisation — notably (though by no means exclusively) by
Kuhn (1962) and Quine (1951) and in the recognised failure of Carnap’s project
in the Aufbau (1928) — that observation is theory-laden, that there is no clean
separation of the vocabulary of science into a part which represents our obser-
vations, or the macroworld, or ‘medium-size dry goods’, and a part which does
not. And so no actual scientific theory can be analysed as the logical positivists
propose.
Non-representationalist strategies at least seem to be committed to making
the same division, whether the analog of the ‘observation language’ is Copen-
hagen’s use of classical mechanics, or pragmatism’s ‘non-quantum’ description,
or QBism’s appeal to direct experience. The problem with these approaches,
as with positivism, is not that making such a distinction is unreasonable or
illegitimate, but that — at least at present — we do not know how to do it.
6 Modifications of quantum theory
Non-representational strategies continue to have a significant following among
physicists, but philosophers have generally given them short shrift. Their gen-
eral attitude is well-captured by Tim Maudlin’s paraphrase of Hume:
[W]e can be clear on the questions that must be asked of an interpre-
tation. Is it an additional variables interpretation whose dynamics
guarantee solutions to the problem of statistics and the problem of
effect? Is it a collapse theory that leads to appropriate outcome
states with the right probabilities, and whose fundamental terms all
have clear physical significance? If the answer in each case is “no”,
then commit it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion.(Maudlin 1995)
To a substantial degree, philosophers of quantum mechanics have followed Maudlin’s
line, focussing on solutions to the measurement problem that either (a) augment
quantum theory with additional ‘hidden’ variables whose task it is to represent
the physical world, or (b) modify the Schro¨dinger equation to introduce ‘dy-
namical collapse’ and so remove macroscopic superpositions (there is, perhaps,
increasing willingness to consider the Everett interpretation alongside these two
strategies).
In principle, either strategy could fit the ‘recipe model’ I laid out in section
4. A hidden-variable theory would be a fairly general recipe to assign additional
variables to a quantum system, presumably picked out in some way in terms of
the observables and the dynamics of that system; a dynamical collapse theory
12Which is not to say that arguments of this sort played no role in the fall of logical posi-
tivism: Putnam (1962), for one, gave arguments of this kind. (I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for the observation.)
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would be a recipe for modifying the Schro¨dinger equation given the same in-
puts. For the recipe to be consistent, it would have to behave properly in cases
of inter-theoretic reduction: if h(X) is the hidden-variable theory associated
with quantum theory X, and some particular quantum theory X1 instantiates
higher-level quantum theory X2 in some regime, then hidden-variable theory
h(X2) would have to be derivable from h(X1) in the same regime (and simi-
larly for dynamical-collapse theories). For the recipe to solve the measurement
problem, it would have to handle the quantum-classical transition correctly:
in those regimes where quantum theories reduce formally to classical theories,
the hidden-variable or dynamical-collapse theory would need to reduce to the
appropriate classical theory in a way which properly predicts unique classical
outcomes.
There is even a concrete class of hidden-variable theories that actually aspire
to realising this picture (I don’t know of any dynamical-collapse strategy which
aims to do so). The modal interpretation13 really does give a general recipe
for hidden variables, applicable to any quantum system, and which at first
sight does reproduce definite outcomes in the classical limit. The generally (not
universally) accepted failure of that approach, conversely, can be attributed in
large part to a mixture of (a) its failure to tell a fully consistent story at different
levels of description (the hidden variables depend sensitively on the details of the
system/subsystem decomposition; (Arntzenius (1990, 1998), (Clifton 1996)) and
(b) the failure of its account of the quantum-classical transition to handle the
necessary approximations involved in that transition (Bacciagaluppi, Donald,
and Vermaas (1995), Donald (1998), Bacciagaluppi (2000)). (See Wallace (2008,
s.2.6.3) for further discussion.)
But the bulk of discussion of dynamical-collapse and hidden-variable theo-
ries takes a very different form. It is almost entirely concerned with theories
which supplement or modify one specific quantum theory: non-relativistic par-
ticle mechanics. Indeed, it is almost entirely concerned with two specific such
theories: de Broglies and Bohm’s pilot-wave theory, aka Bohmian mechanics
(Bohm 1952; Bell 1987; Bohm and Hiley 1993) and the‘GRW’ collapse theory
(Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986), sometimes with lip service paid to the need
to modify the latter along the lines of Pearle’s ‘CSL’ theory (Pearle 1989) in
order to account adequately for identical particles.
Furthermore, the way Bohmian mechanics, and GRW theory, are normally
discussed in philosophy of physics (especially in more metaphysical contexts) is
sharply at odds with the relatively humble role nonrelativistic particle mechan-
ics plays in real quantum theory (where, recall, it is a useful model to describe
various particular systems of nonrelativistic particles in the absence of radia-
tion, normally with some phenomenologically-understood background fields and
potentials). The only way I know to make sense of (most of) this literature is to
interpret it as discussing nonrelativistic quantum particle mechanics under the
fiction that it is a fundamental and universal theory. The literature is too large
13Originally proposed by van Fraassen (1991) and developed by many authors; see Dieks
and Vermaas (1998) and references therein.
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to demonstrate this exhaustively, but here are some illustrative recent examples
(all drawn from Ney and Albert’s recent anthology, The Wave Function (2013)):
1. Albert (2013, p.53) describes the dimensionality of configuration space as
“three times as large as the total number of elementary particles in the
universe’, despite the fact that most such particles are not describable in
the configuration-space formalism in most regimes.
2. Lewis (2013, p.111) follows Albert: “quantum mechanics represents the
state of the world via a 3N -dimensional wave function, where N is the
number of particles in the universe”.
3. Allori (2013), in her discussion of ‘primitive ontology’ — of which more
later — is explicit (in her title, no less) that she is discussing “the struc-
ture of fundamental physical theories”, and then proceeds to apply her
framework to nonrelativistic particle mechanics.
4. North (2013, pp.184-5) is refreshingly explicit: “[T]he fundamental struc-
ture of a world’s space(time) may be more properly given by a relativistic
theory. Still, it is plausible that the fundamental theory of our world will
be quantum mechanical. So it is worthwhile to think about what the
world’s fundamental space would be if [nonrelativistic quantum particle
mechanics] is its fundamental theory”.
But why work under this fiction? I think the most charitable assumption (which
assumes authors realise that it is a fiction14) is that it is a warm-up exercise:
‘nonrelativistic quantum particle mechanics’ is a standin for the real fundamen-
tal quantum theory, and we hope that as many as possible of our conclusions
carry over to hoped-for hidden-variables or dynamical-collapse theories formu-
lated for the real fundamental theory.
In previous work, I have taken the referent of ‘real fundamental quantum
theory’ to be something like the Standard Model, and have argued that this
strategy is problematic both technically (Wallace 2008, pp.83-85, Wallace 2012,
pp.33–35), because it is much harder than is generally recognised to construct
a quantum-field-theory version of Bohmian mechanics or GRW theory and so
confidence that such a theory even exists in premature, and conceptually (Wal-
lace 2016a), because most of the features of nonrelativistic quantum theory
appealed-to by metaphysicians of quantum mechanics are emergent approxi-
mations at best in QFT. But from this paper’s perspective, these criticisms
do not get at the heart of the problem: that any strategy that works only
when applied to a universal and fundamental theory does not seem to have
the resources to explain the success of quantum mechanics in general, which is
mediated through a very large number of explicitly non-fundamental physical
theories. Absent any strategy for systematically constructing hidden-variable
14Philosophers of physics mostly do so realise, I think; certainly, all the authors I cite
above do. But the very fact that the fiction is rarely spelled out explicitly creates a real risk
of confusion, especially in more mainstream metaphysics discussions which get their physics
second-hand from the philosophy of physics literature.
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or dynamical-collapse versions of higher-level theories from lower-level theories,
any hypothetical Bohmian or dynamical-collapse version of the standard model
has a gap when it comes to connecting quantum theory with phenomenology
and empirical confirmation.
Can the gap be filled? Doing so would seem to require us to find a way to
provide information, directly in the language of the fundamental, about what
can be observed. And the current thrust of work in the metaphysics of hidden-
variable and dynamical-collapse theories aims to do exactly that. A particu-
larly clear example is the ‘primitive ontology’ strategy of Allori et al (2008,
2013, this volume) (Maudlin’s (2013) ‘primary ontology’ is a close relative; Es-
feld et al (2017) adopt essentially the same framework). The idea is that to
any purportedly-fundamental theory must be associated a primitive ontology of
spatially-localised matter (point particles or extended continua), such that the
macroscopic world is identified with composites of the primitive ontology. (A
table, for instance, is by definition a collection of primitive-ontology elements
arranged in a table shape — the mereological sum of that collection, in meta-
physical parlance.) We are assumed to have direct empirical access to at least
coarse grainings of the primitive ontology, and so the condition for empirical
success of a fundamental theory is that it generates a distribution of primitive-
ontology elements whose coarse grainings match our observations of macroscopic
matter. Non-primitive ontology might also be admitted to our theory (the elec-
tromagnetic field is supposed to be a classical example of non-primitive ontology;
the quantum state represents non-primitive quantum ontology) but it has no
direct role in empirical confirmation: we learn of it only indirectly, through its
dynamical effect on the primitive ontology. Primitive ontologists seldom discuss
non-fundamental theories, but so far as I can see, in their framework these are
of purely instrumental value, providing calculational techniques to extract in-
formation about the primitive ontology but having no ontological significance
of their own.
Four observations follow naturally. Firstly, although advocates of primitive
ontology often write as if theirs is an unproblematic account of the physics-world
relation before quantum mechanics (usually cashed out in terms of a primitive
ontology of classical point particles), they do not provide historical arguments
for this and it looks most implausible. The ‘particles’ to which classical particle
mechanics was applied historically were typically the centers of mass of large
bodies (planets, moons and comets in celestial mechanics, in particular). Other
applications of classical mechanics were directly to extended objects like fluids
and rigid bodies. Whatever the hope might have been that these large bodies
could be understood as swarms of smaller bodies, that hope was never realised,
and we now know that it could not be realised: classical microphysics does not
support stable matter, and systems like comets or liquids (pace Allori (2013))
cannot be analysed as agglomerates of classical particles.
Secondly, if we want to look for a primitive ontology for extant physics, pre-
sumably we had better look in the Standard Model. But the task of finding
a characterisation of the macroscopic within the basic vocabulary of the Stan-
dard Model looks monumentally difficult. Most of the connections between the
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Standard Model and experiment are fantastically indirect, proceeding through
layers upon layers of only-partially-understood emergence — so indirect, indeed,
that philosophers like Cartwright can deny that the predictions of higher-level
physics are grounded in the Standard Model at all with at least prima facie
plausibility. Even those predictions which are ‘direct’ results of the Standard
Model — the Higgs boson, say — are not stated in anything like a primitive
ontology: the experimental signature of the Higgs boson is a certain resonance
in the cross-section for hadron-hadron scattering, and of course ‘resonance’,
‘cross-section’, ‘scattering’ and ‘hadron’ are all highly theory-laden terms.
(Does the primitive-ontology strategy succeed in defining the observable in
terms of the microscopic in non-relativistic particle mechanics, under the fiction
that this theory is universal and fundamental? Never mind why the question
is of any interest; it is not even well posed. For beings like us (who, inter alia,
make most of our ‘observations’ using electromagnetic radiation) could not exist
under the assumptions of that fiction. They who do not exist, do not observe.)
So the primitive ontologist is committed to forging a direct link between
high-energy physics and observation, with little or no help from actual physical
practice. And (my third observation) the task is made still harder by features of
quantum field theories in particular. Recall that the Standard Model, like pretty
much any empirically-relevant quantum field theory, is an effective field theory,
regularised by some short-distance cutoff. The physics at the cutoff lengthscale
is far from negligible, but it is possible to absorb its effects via ‘renormalisa-
tion’, whereby those degrees of freedom that describe the quantum field theory
at large lengthscales are redefined in a complicated, cutoff-dependent way that
absorbs most of the effects of the short-distance physics. (See Wallace (2017),
and references therein, for a more detailed discussion from a conceptual point
of view and for further details.) This means that the relation between the ‘fun-
damental’ and the empirically-relevant in quantum field theory is complicated,
indirect, dynamically mediated and cutoff-dependent. It is very hard to see how
this could be made compatible with the primitive-ontology approach, or indeed
with any approach committed to a description of a theory’s empirical content
directly in its microphysical vocabulary. It is notable that none of the various
extant suggestions for Bohmian quantum field theories — based on associating
the hidden variables to fermion number density (Bell 1984; Colin 2003; Colin
and Struyve 2007), or particle number (Durr et al 2004), or field-configuration-
strength (Struyve and Westman (2006, 2007), Struyve 2007) — have discussed
renormalisation, or given more than a qualitative verbal plausibility argument
for how these theories recover the macroworld. The acid test of such a theory is
to demand a full model of how some nontrivial quantum-field-theoretic predic-
tion — say, the cross-section for electron-electron scattering, calculated to loop
order where renormalisation matters — actually plays out as a physical process,
but no such theory is currently close to passing that test.)
The considerations of effective field theory are really just a reminder that
even though the Standard Model is the closest we have to a fundamental physi-
cal theory, it is not such a theory, and could not be: its emergent, approximate
status is built into its characterisation as an effective field theory. And this
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brings me to the last observation: if the primitive-ontology strategy makes a
direct connection between fundamental physics and observation, and higher-
level, emergent physics is to be treated purely instrumentally, what — beyond
idle curiosity — is the point of trying to develop such an approach until and
unless we have a physical theory which we have reason to think is fundamen-
tal? (Not that I am sanguine about the prospects of developing a primitive
ontology for that theory either: its ‘observational’ claims are likely to be even
more indirect and theory-laden than the Standard Model’s.) Even in its own
terms, the primitive-ontology strategy seems to be a strategy for postponing
the measurement problem until the dust of fundamental physics has otherwise
settled.
There is something rather ironic about this situation. Advocates of hidden-
variable or dynamical-collapse theories are normally ardently committed to some
form of scientific realism; to compare them to the logical positivists would be a
killing insult. But what are the advocates of primitive ontology looking for, if
not something like the observation language that the logical positivists sought
in vain?15 And again, the problem with this strategy is not so much that the
metaphysical distinction between primitive and non-primitive ontology is ill-
defined or unmotivated; it is that we do not know how to make it, for realistic
physics, in a way which achieves the task it is supposed to perform.
For expository clarity I have focussed here on primitive-ontology strategies,
but I believe the observations generalise. The mainstream modificatory ap-
proaches to the measurement problem are committed to (1) developing modi-
fications specifically to ‘fundamental’ quantum theory with only an instrumen-
talist attitude to non-fundamental quantum theories; (2) finding a direct way to
characterise the observational evidence for that fundamental theory in its micro-
physical vocabulary. These commitments disconnect modificatory approaches
from physics as it is practiced, and leave it opaque at best how they can hope
to account for the empirical predictions of quantum theory writ large.
7 Conclusions
I have argued that when we recognise the real structure of quantum theory —
an abstract framework realised by indefinitely many concrete theories that are
realised by indefinitely many concrete systems and whose relations one with an-
other are complicated and not really hierarchical — then most extant approaches
to the quantum measurement problem should be recognised as inadequate to
that real structure. Of currently-extant approaches, only the Everett interpre-
tation, in its modern decoherence-based form, provides the interpretative recipe
to make sense of the multiplicity of quantum theories in a self-consistent way.
Other approaches either try to make sense of the abstract structure of quantum
15The parallels extend to attempts to treat the non-primary ontology as lawlike (Du¨rr,
Goldstein, and Zanghi 1997; Goldstein and Teufel 2000; Goldstein and Zanghi 2013), or to
eliminate it entirely at the metaphysical level via a Humean account of laws (Esfeld et al 2014,
Miller 2014). See Dewar (2017) for further discussion.
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theory and thus fail to give an adequate account of scientific representation in
concrete applications, or else analyse one particular quantum theory as if it alone
could exhaust the theoretical content of the subject, and as if all experimental
predictions could be described directly in its vocabulary. If this is correct, there
is no underdetermination in quantum mechanics: either the Everett interpre-
tation is viable, in which case it alone provides an adequate interpretation of
quantum theory; or else it must be rejected for some philosophical or technical
reason, in which case there is at present no adequate interpretation of quantum
theory.
To the reader who resists this conclusion, there is a straightforward way to
prove me wrong. Take any moderately-complicated, moderately-concrete appli-
cation of quantum theory in a regime which is not fully covered by nonrelativis-
tic particle mechanics: take the BCS model of superconductivity, for instance
(with electromagnetic radiation present), or take the quark-gluon plasma, or
take the Higgs mechanism, or take the colour of gold; come to that, take the
photoelectric effect, or the (photon) two-slit experiment. Explain, in reasonable
detail, how that application is to be described, understood, and tested inside
your preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. And check, in particular,
that your preferred interpretation can be used to make the quantitative cal-
culations whose match with experiment is the reason why those applications
are deemed successful. The Everett interpretation can do this, at least if its
account of probability and the structuralist notions of emergence that it relies
on are deemed adequate, simply by working through the standard accounts of
these applications in physics and interpreting each particular version of quan-
tum mechanics appealed to in Everettian terms. If your preferred alternative
to Everettian quantum mechanics cannot do it, you have not yet solved the
quantum measurement problem.
This might seem like cheating. What I have called an ‘Everettian’ way
of making sense of concrete quantum applications is, after all, really just the
explanation of those applications found within mainstream physics. But this
simply underlines the fact that Everettian quantum mechanics — ontological
extravagance at the macro-level notwithstanding — is a modest, conservative
project, aimed at legitimating and making sense of the ordinary practice of
quantum theory. Other approaches to the measurement problem, by and large,
are less conservative: the ordinary practice of quantum theory is fundamentally
confused and in large part needs to be reformulated or replaced, not ‘made sense
of’. But the great virtue of modesty and conservatism, in this context, is that
it minimises the need to redo from scratch much of the last century of physics.
Let me finish, as did Maudlin (ibid), by paraphrasing Hume: We can be clear
on the questions that must be asked of an interpretation. Does it provide a way
to legitimate and make sense of the actual practice of quantum physics, across
the various interrelated domains to which quantum theory has been applied?
Does it set out to reform the practice of quantum physics, and does it pro-
vide evidence that this is more than a bluff by actually doing the hard work in
some non-trivial, concrete examples across multiple instantiations of the quan-
tum framework (and not just in an abstract quantum-information setting, or
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in nonrelativistic particle mechanics)? If the answer in each case is “no” . . . ,
well, maybe don’t hastily commit it to the flames, as it may contain valuable
insights and be the seed of a yet-to-be-completed research program, but don’t
kid yourself that it is at present a viable interpretation of quantum mechanics,
and maybe be a bit cautious exploring all its metaphysical implications until
you’ve done some more work to see if it plausibly might be made viable.
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